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INTRODUCTION
Treaty enti tlements to hunt, fish, and gather natural
resources in the Great Lakes region have become
increasingly contentious since the early nineteen
seventies, coinciding with a period of federal Indian
policy that has been described as “Tribal Self-
determination.” This renewal of interest by native people1
has paralleled events in the Pacific northwest where a
landmark decision by federal judge George Boldt in 1974
set the stage for a succession  of cases that  have revita lized
tribal fisheries all over the United States. One of the most
recent conflicts to gain public attention is the dispute
between the State of Minnesota and the Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians over exercise of treaty rights
reserved by the Indians in the Treaty of 1837. The Mille
Lacs case is particular ly interesting because it revisits a
number of issues already addressed by earlier court
decisions. It is being litigated at a t ime when pr ior
experience with a very similar situation in Wisconsin
provides an opportun ity for reasonable speculation as to
the resource management outcomes should the Minnesota
Indians have their rights (as they see them) reaffirmed at
the appellate court level.
 
This paper documents the current situation in Minnesota
and Wisconsin through  the succession of treaties and
court cases. We will examine the nature of the rights
themselves and their current reduction to contemporary
practice.  In the pr ocess, I hope to further define the issues
and identify common misperceptions about the exercise
of treaty rights in a multicultural context.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIAN RELATIONS
The earliest European set tlers in  North America
established their new homes on a continent already
occupied by over 400 independent nations. Most Indian
tribes welcomed or tolerated the arrival of Europeans and
began to actively trade land and resources for European
goods. Deloria and Lytle (1983) ascribe the European
interface with Indians to the theological  beliefs of
Francisco de Vitoria who concluded that Indians were
true owners of the land. Thus, it was appropriate for the
Spaniards to travel and trade in North America, but they
could not claim title by discovery, as this was appropriate
only for property without ownership. Treaties thenceforth
became the instruments for legal and political intercourse
between Indian societies and Europeans (Deloria and
Lytle, 1983). The importance of recognition of Indian
societies was manifest in formal alliances such as that
between the Iroquois Confederacy and English colonists
in their disputes with  French colonists at the outset of the
French and Indian  Wars in 1763 (Pevar, 1992).
Formalization of the relationship between the U.S.
government and Indians is expressed in the U.S.
Const itut ion in Articles I and II. In the Commerce
Clause, the Constitution specifies (Art. I, Sect. 8, clause
3): “ Congress shall have the Power ... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, ... and with the Indian
Tribes.” In the Treaty Clause ( Art. II, Sect. 2, clause 2),
the President is empowered “by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties,...” This text
establishes the basis for the contention today that state
governments have no jurisdiction in Indian affairs unless
specifically authorized by Congress.2
In the first few decades of existence of the new United
States government, treaties continued as a means of
ensuring peaceful relat ionships between Indians and non-
Indians,  and they became increasingly important as
instruments of land transfer between Indians and the
United States. In a succession of cases beginning in 1823,
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall
began to interpret Indian nations as “domestic dependent
nations” that enjoyed a sovereignty entitling them to
govern themselves and to engage in political relations
with the federal government (Deloria and Lytle, 1983).
These early decisions, the Cherokee cases, may have been
“the two most influential decisions in all of Indian law”
(Canby,  1988). Th e first, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
established Indian tribes as political sovereigns in the
limited sense of domestic dependent nations. In
Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall’s opin ion
is the foundat ion of jurisdict ional law that excludes states
from power over Indian affa irs (Canby, 1988). President
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Andrew Jackson’s refusal to enforce the Supreme Court
ruling in Worcester v. Georgia was a harbinger  of a
multitude of policy reversals and inconsistencies that
would cloud Indian relations over the following century
Indian law scholars3 recognize several critical periods in
development of federal Indian policy (Table 1).  Canby
(1988) notes that policies toward Indians were often
under taken to set arigh t conditions that had further
deteriora ted in Indian  commun ities as a consequence of
previous administrative or legal act ion.  The efficacy of
this approach  is evident in  the frequency of reversals in
policies toward Indians. Fr om 1828-1934 there was an
initial attempt to separate Indians from white settlers first
by relocating Indians further  westward, and subsequently
by sequestering Indians on specified reservations. When
these tactics failed to limit conflicts between cultures,
forcible assimilation was attempted by offering land
patents to individual Indians if they would adopt an
agrarian lifestyle (General Allotment  Act of 1887). After
the required period of residency or improvement, the
individuals who had been granted title to their land were
free to sell it. This resulted in rapid diminution of
territories under Indian control and ownership. From the
138 million acres under tribal ownership in 1887, only 48
mill ion acres remained in 1934 when the allotment
system was abolished (Canby, 1988).
The adverse effects that  the General Allotment Act had
inflicted upon Indians were slow to be officially
recognized, but in 1926, Secretary of the Interior Hubert
Work commissioned a revealing study on the social and
economic status of Indians (Deloria and Lytle, 1983).
Published in 1928, the Meriam Report4 disclosed a
withering array of examples and documentation of policy
gone wrong. Conditions among the Indians were said to
be so deplorable that the veracity of the report itself was
questioned, precipitating yet another  round of
investigation before substantive remedial legislation could
be enacted. Finally, in 1934, the Indian Reorganizat ion
Act (Wheeler-Howar d Act) terminated the policy of
allotment and provided opportunities for Indian tribes to
organize themselves in to effective self-governing units
(Deloria and Lytle, 1983).
The Indian Reorganization Act, and after  it, the two
identifiable periods in Indian policy that bring us to the
present, are continuing testimony to the fact that there
has never been closure to the issue of how much land
remains under the control  of Indians, or how much
federal assistance is implied by the trust relationship
between the U.S. governmen t and its “domestic
dependent nations.” Add to this the additional complexity
of Indian  activities off-reservation and the reciprocal
problem of how non-Indian act ivities off-reservation
impact Indian li fe, and the stage is set for the recent and
continuing controversies over Indian  use of fish, wildlife,
and water resources.
TREATY ENTITLEMENTS TO HARVESTABLE
RESOURCES
Indian entitlement to hunt and fish free of state regulation
on reservations established by treaty is rarely contested.
Even Public Law 280 which extended state authority to a
number of civil and criminal matters on Indian land
explicitly exempts these activi ties from state control
(Clinton  et al., 1991). The question that has been broadly
challenged is that of Indian fishing off reservations on
land ceded by treaty to the federal government during the
last century. Jurisdictional problems in these cases range
form questions about  the extinguishment of the treaties
themselves to interpretation of the intent  of the treaties
and, ultimately, to definitions of when it is appropriate
and legal for states to intervene in the harvesting
activities. Even after the legal issues have (apparently)
been settled, non-Indian interests regularly question
whether or not the best interests of conservation and
regional economics have been served.
Except for limited reference to earlier  cases as needed for
clarification  of concepts or precedents, the following
discussion will deal with  the case curr ently under
litigation in the State of Minnesota, and its predecessor,
the Voigt case in Wisconsin. These cases involve the
Treaty of 1837 in which the Chippewa nation of Indians
ceded to the U.S. government a tract of land extending
from north-central Wisconsin on the east to central
Minnesota on the west (Fig. 1). Chippewa entitlements
remaining in the Wisconsin portion of the ceded territory
were litigated in a succession of cases (Voigt) beginning
in 1973 in U.S. District Court for the Western  District  of
Wisconsin. Settlement for the Wisconsin judicial district
( including consideration of the entitlements pursuant to
the Treaty of 1842) was achieved with the decision of
District Judge Barbara B. Crabb in Lac Courte Oreilles
v. State of Wisconsin (LCO VIII) in 1991 (Satz, 1991).
Interpretation of the entitlements of the Treaty of 1837
are being litigated again in Minnesota simply because the
judicial boundaries today leave the Minnesota jurisdiction
with the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.
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Before identifying the issues, it is important to recognize
legal traditions relating to treaties. Judicial scholars
identify four “canons of construction” or principles of
interpretation in regard to treaties (Satz, 1991): 1) treat ies
are to be construed in favor of the Indians; 2) ambiguous
language in treaties must be resolved in favor of the
Indians;  3) treaties must be construed as the Indians
would have understood them when they were negotiated;
and, 4) treaty rights may not be extinguished by mere
implication, but rather explicit action must be taken in
“clear language” in order to abrogate them.
This apparently paternalist ic interpretation of treaties
derives from a recognition that the “unlettered peoples”
negotiating these treaties were not an equal linguistic
footing with the English-speaking representatives of the
U.S. government. It is also clear that the special trust
relationship between the U.S.  government and Indians
requires the government  to behave as a guardian to its
wards (Chief Justice Marshall’s language in the Cherokee
cases). The fourth canon above also relates to what has
become known as the “reserved rights doctrine.” Deloria
and Lytle (1983) encapsulate this idea by stating the
treaties reserve to the Indians all rights that have not been
explicitly granted away. The language of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Winans is particularly
informative where it says a treaty is “not a grant of right
to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them — a
reservation  of those not granted.”5  Thus, express
provision for food-gathering rights is not necessary to
establish their existence (Clinton, et al., 1991).
One additional legal definition, the prin ciple of
usufructuary rights, is necessary as a preamble to
considerat ion of the midwestern cases. Usufructuary
rights are a special category of property rights that confer
usage privileges upon the h older of those rights. These
privileges may be reserved from sale in pending transfers
of title, as is commonly done in cases of water or mineral
rights.  It has often been argued that  continuing uses of
ceded territories by Indians for hunting, fishing, and
gathering are merely usufructuary rights, not transferred
with land title unless explicitly extinguished.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN THE
TREATY CONTEXT
Issues requiring resolution in the Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Minnesota  cases fall into two broad ca tegories of
concerns, existence or  continuation of rights, and
“conservation” of natural resources. While these are yet
to be fully resolved in Minnesota, the outcome of the
Michigan and Wisconsin cases may provide indications
of what to expect in Minnesota.
Existence of Indian righ ts to continue hunting and fishing
on the ceded lands have been interpreted as usufructuary
rights and upheld by the courts. Specific language in the
treaties of 1837, 1842 and 1854 reserves those rights:
Treaty of 1837, ARTICLE 5: “The pr ivilege of
hunting,  fishing, and gathering the wild rice,
upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included
in the territory ceded, is guaranteed to the
Indians,  during th e pleasure of the President of
the United States.”
Treaty of 1842, ARTICLE II: “The Indians
stipulate for the right of hunting on the ceded
ter ritory, with the other usual  privi leges of
occupancy, until required to remove by the
President of the United States,...”
Treaty of 1854, ARTICLE 11: “And such of
them as reside in  the terr itory hereby ceded,
shall have the right to hunt and fish therein,
until otherwise ordered by the President.”
The qualifying language in these passages suggests to a
modern reader that the President  would have “unbridled
discretion” to extinguish the usufructuary rights (Clinton,
et al., 1991).
In 1850, President Taylor, at the request of Indian affairs
officials and Alexander Ramsay, Governor of the
Minnesota Territory, issued an order revoking the
Wisconsin Indian’s usufructuary rights and removing the
Chippewa to their unceded lands (reservation). Taylor’s
order was broadly unpopular with the Wisconsin
legislature and citizens of the region south of Lake
Superior (Satz, 1991). The order was indefinitely
suspended in August of 1851, “until the final
determination of the President...” (Satz, 1991). Taylor’s
successor, Millard Fillmore,  upon meeting in Washington
in June of 1852 with a delegation of Chippewa headed by
Chief Buffalo (then in his nineties), is though to have
permanently rescinded the removal order . Although no
written record has been found confirming this, an
executive order cannot exceed the scope of the authority
delegated by Congress (in the treaty) so legal scholars
have general ly concluded tha t the Removal Order of 1850
was invalid (Clinton, et al., 1991).
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Modern jurists are thus faced with the problem of judging
whether or not  the usufructuary rights of the Chippewa
continue to exist. Can on 3 above requires an
interpretation of how the Indians perceived the qualifying
conditions at the time the treaties were signed. Judge
Doyle (LCO case), in  interpreting the writings of both
Indian and non-Indian observers at the signing of the
Treaty of 1842, concluded that the Indians had been
assured that they would not  be required to move from the
territory unless they misbehaved, i.e. “made war, or
otherwise acted violently against whites.” (Satz, 1991).
Absent evidence of such misbehavior on the part of the
Indians, the courts have upheld the continuing existence
of usufructuary rights in  the Wisconsin case.
The final issue in the Wisconsin case regarding existence
of the property rights focused upon determining “how
much of the resource base” the Chippewa were entitled
to. In concluding Phase I of the trial (LCO III), Judge
Doyle ruled that  the Indians could harvest plant and
animal resources throughout the ceded territories to an
extent necessary to main tain  for themselves a “modest or
moderate” standard of living. Shortly thereafter, Judge
Doyle died, leaving the Voigt case to Judge Barbara
Crabb.
Continuing in the “economics phase” of the case,
plaintiffs6 argued before the Crabb court that a modest
standard of living might reasonably be judged coincident
with a “zero savings” level of income, a demographic
statistic available from U.S. Census Bureau tables. For
northern Wisconsin, this would amount to an annual
household income of approximately $ 21,000. These
ensued extensive test imony regarding the abundance of
consumable fish, deer, waterfowl and wild rice
throughout the ceded terr itory. Retail market pr ices
corresponding to fish, red meat, chicken and other
consumables were then tendered for calculation of
resource values. It was even suggested that black bear gall
bladders, worth several  hundred dollars apiece on the
aphrodisiac market, might be included in the evaluation.
Long before the evidence had been completely reviewed,
it was clear tha t the aggregate value of edible resources
would not even come close to providing a modest
standard of living with the households of the nearly 7500
tribal members living on or near reservations in the ceded
territories. This result was subsequently reflected in Judge
Crabb’s final opinion7: Plaintiffs’ modest living needs
cannot be met from the present available harvest even if
plaintiffs were physically capable of harvesting, gathering
and processing it.” If the logic of the economic phase of
the trial were to be pursued, the obvious result would be
that the Indians would be ent itled to the entire annual
harvest of consumable resources across the ceded
territories. 
In the Pacific northwest, Judge Bold8 had allocated 50 per
cent of the allowable harvest (defined below) to Indian
interests. There, the treaties explicitly stated that the
Indians would have “The right of taking fish at usual and
accustomed grounds ... in common with all citizens of the
Ter ritory, ... “ During the economics phase of the
Wisconsin trial, state attorneys petitioned the court to
make a similar allocation in Wisconsin, but Judge Crabb,
acknowledging the language in the western tr eaties,9
refused to grant the State request, stating that she could
find no such language in these treaties (Treaties of 1837
and 1842). Three years later, overcome by pragmatism
and a well-entrench resort industry based upon
recreational fishing, Judge Crabb concluded: “The
standard of a modest living does not provide a practical
way to determine the plaintiff’s share of the harvest
potential of the ceded territory.” In a colossal  reversal of
her earlier  thinking, her final judgment declared: “All of
the harvestable natural resources to which  plaintiffs
retain a usufructuary right  are declared to be apportioned
equally between the plaintiffs and all other persons,  ...”
The enormity of this provision was not lost on (then)
Attorney General James E. Doyle, Jr.10 who counted
Judge Crabb’s conclusion among seven significant
victories for Wisconsin in this case. 11
The outcome of the 1979 Fox decision,12 Voigt (LCO),
and other midwestern cases clearly established that
hunting,  fishing and gather ing righ ts cont inue to exist
under Nineteenth Century treaties. The consequences are
that a real competition arises between Indians and non-
Indians;  for access to publicly-held resources. Just as the
1974 Boldt decision in  the Pacific northwest affected
fishing in hundreds of streams and dozens of watersheds,
so too did the cases in Wisconsin and Michigan  involve
hundreds of lakes and thousands of acres of public land.
The combined areas of the treaties of 1836, 1937 and
1842 (Fig.  1) included the northern one-third of
Wisconsin and over half the land mass of Mich igan.
Resolution of the issues would require even further
definitions of the lands and waters remaining within the
provisions of the treaties.
The simplest boundary disputes were resolved by
returning to the language of the treaties in defining the
“metes and bounds” of the lands ceded. But complications
arose where the cession boundar ies projected across water
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bodies rather than  following the “natural” shorel ine.
Since the treaties referred to landmarks for demarcation
of boundaries it became necessary to further define the
entitlements for those cases in which the imaginary
boundary line crossed the open waters of a lake.
In deciding the boundary issue in State v. Gurnoe et al.,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court (1972) found that the right
of Indians to fish on Lake Superior had been guaranteed
in the treaty of 1854 (Whaley and Bresette, 1994). The
Michigan Supreme Court (1971) in People v. Jondreau,
ruled (in keeping with the second canon of construction
above ) that the Keweenaw Bay Indians, living on the
shore of Lake Superior, would have understood the “right
to fish” meant “ right to fish on Keweenaw Bay,” even
though the waters of Lake Superior were not explicitly
identified within the “ceded territory.” This reasoning
was extended in Lac Courte Oreilles v. State of
Wisconsin (LCO III), where the court concluded that the
Indians would have understood (canon 3) “that they were
guaranteed the right to make a  moderate standard of
living off the land and the waters in and abutting
(emphasis added) the ceded territory.” 
CONSERVATION ISSUES
With “ter ritorial” and “treaty existence” issues at rest in
the Wisconsin case, the remaining questions revolve
around several topics in the sphere of “conservation.” As
noted earlier, federal law prohibits states from interfering
in the affairs of Indians except  in the in terests of
conservation  and public safety (Clinton, et al., 1991). An
argument for state authority to control off-reservation
Indian hunting and fishing must therefore be justified on
these grounds.
Conservation  issue sin treaty cases have covered a broad
spectrum of individual topics, including methods of
capture,  quanti ties of resources to be taken  and the
management authority and protocols governing the
harvest. It is generally agreed that “conservation” means
util izat ion of living resources in such a  manner that the
sustained productivity of the stock or species is not
jeopardized by the harvest. This is an embodiment of the
common notion that fish  and wildlife resources annually
produce a “surplus” of biomass that can be harvested
without endangering the reproductive potential or future
productivity of the resource. It is important to recognize
that this sense of “conservation” has never been at issue
with Indian or  non-Indian in terests. Al l have agreed that
any allocation refers to what might reasonably be taken as
a sustainable harvest, and that no one is entitled to utilize
the resource if no such surplus exists. Nevertheless, there
has continually been a re-statement of suspicion in the
non-Indian community that “conservation” will  not be
served if Indians use efficient modes of capture in taking
the fish or wildl ife. In examining the fishing contr oversy
arising from tribal interests in salmon and steelhead
fishing during the decade of the sixties in the Pacific
northwest, the American Friends Service Committee
(Anon. 1970, p. 191) concluded:
“However real  and serious the problems of
conservation, they are not the basis of this
controversy. The real issue is the attitude of the
whole society toward difference.”
Nor was the Pacific northwest the only theater  in which
the “conservation” question may simply have been a
facade to cover a more odious design to wrest  control over
fish and wildlife from Indians. In analysis of the Fox
decision, historian Robert Doherty argues th at control of
resource management by the state may have been a more
compelling motive for the State of Michigan than the
conservation issue (Doherty, 1990, Chapter 7).
In the Wisconsin case, much of the public outcry centered
on spearing spawning walleye in the spring. The
Chippewa proposed to use modern boats, steel-pronged
spears, headlamps and electric trolling motors to pursue
fish in shallow water after nightfall. While an  outspoken
public was inclined to suggest that the Indians should use
birch-bark canoes, wooden spears and pine torches, the
courts found that  no such  constr aints were expressed or
implied in the treaties, nor have any such constraints
been characteristic of the development of non-Indian
fisheries since the signing of the treaties. It might further
be argued that the very provision of firearms and steel
traps to the Indians in consideration  of their cessions of
land to the U.S. government testifies to the expectation
that the Indians would employ “ modern” methods of
capture in their  pursuit  of fish and game.
Opposition to spear fishing also in cluded notions of a
“sense of fair chase” ( a non-Indian cultural  perspective
) coupled with two biological r ationales which have
become regular features of the management mythology
perpetuated by our conservation agencies, specifically: 1)
that killing animals during the annual reproductive
season is biologically unsound; and 2) that taking females
is biologically injurious to the stock.
Belief in these tenets is so strongly held by the general
public that it is not necessary for agency administrators to
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promulgate falsehoods in respect to the biological
requirements for conservation. Benign refusal to debunk
unfounded public misperceptions is sufficient to
perpetuate those myths. Again, in the northwest cases
(Anon. 1970):
  
“The state, attempting to establish its own
‘unified control,’ has endeavored to regulate
Indian  off-reservation fish ing. Because a  net in
a river can block it-though less efficiently than
a dam for real estate development or power —
the attack has been based on conservation:
Indians endanger the ‘seed stock for the future.’
The argument ignores th e fact th at al l salmon
are ‘seed stock.” It ignores the effects of the
sportsmen’s fishing on the same rivers, with
different gear but in far greater numbers.”
The first of these myths can be dispelled simply by asking
the rhetorical question: What is th e reproductive
difference to the stock if a particular  female is kil led ( by
a spear) ten minutes before she would have spawned,
rather than six months earlier  (in  the recreat ional fishery)
? The second myth is somewhat more difficult to dismiss
as anyone can see that the number of foals in a heard of
horses is directly related to the number of mares.
Nevertheless, fisheries biologists recognize that
“recruitment overfishing” is often not a problem because
“a handful of fish can produce millions of eggs which, if
they all hatched and survived, would be more than
adequate to ensure future recruitment,” (Gulland, 1983).
The critical issue, of course, is how many fish will be
killed, from all forces of mortality combined in a
particular year. Thus, the efficiency of the gear is
irrelevant as long as the total catch can be controlled.
In the Wisconsin case, the popular misconception of the
“innate dangers in fishing efficient gear” (nets and
spears) prevailed in juxtaposition with the court’s
recogn ition  of the need for biologically sound control of
the fishery (endnote 7 preceding):
“Regula tion of plaintiffs’ off-reservation
usufructuary rights to harvest walleye and
muskellunge .. is reserved to plaintiffs on the
condition that they enact and keep in force a
management plan tha t provides for the
regulation of their members in accordance with
biologically sound principles necessary for the
conservation  of the species ... “ The efficient
gear safe harvest level [emphasis added] shall
be determined by the methods described in the
opinion and order of this court ...” 
Methods by which a  “safe harvest level”  would be
determined were supplied by the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources (Hansen, et al., 1991). They provide
a mechanism to adjust the allowable harvest (by efficient
gear) downward in  accordance with the “reliability” of
the estimates of abundance of the targeted fishery
resources.
The Crabb decision also required the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) to implement
a plan to control the recreational fishery to prevent
overfishing, especially for those waters declared as targets
for the Indian spear fishery. The plan involved reducing
the traditional walleye daily bag limit from five fish per
day to a lesser number in accordance with the propor tion
of the safe harvest level that tribal fisherman would
“declare” by March 15 each year. For example, if the
tribes declared an inten t to take 60 percent of the safe
harvest level from a particular lake, the WDNR would be
obligated to reduce the daily bag limit on that lake to two
fish per day (Anon. 1991, Table 11).
To see the theoretical impact of the tribal fishery in
Wisconsin, let us examine the actual determination of the
numbers of fish to be taken in the spear fishery in
accordance with the ru ling of the Crabb court. State
guidelines for an “acceptable “ maximum exploitation
rate have long been set a 35 percent of the adult stock of
walleye. The Crabb decision allocates a maximum of 50
percent of that amount to Indian interest, but the Indians
may declare an intent to harvest less than their full
entitlement. Typical ly, they have stated an intent to take
a reduced percentage of their enti tlement that  will allow
the WDNR to set the daily bag limit at 2-3 fish (Anon.
1995). Each spr ing, before the spawning season, the
Indians identify the waters they intend to fish so that fish
population  estimates and enforcement pr eparations can be
made. Since spear ing is regarded as an “efficient” gear,
a further  “safety factor” is appl ied to arr ive at a final
catch quota tha t can be allocated among the fishermen.
The safety factor may dimin ish the available fish target
by as little as 35 percent if the population estimate is no
more than a year old, or, as much as 20 percent if the
estimate is old or imprecise. Each fisherman is then
issued a permit  to take a per-determin ed number of fish
from the specified water body on a particular date. These
fish will be duly counted and measured at  a specified
launching/landing site by a conservation officer at the
conclusion of the fishing occasion.
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Say that a  particular lake is though t to have a recent
population  estimate of one thousand adult walleye.
Suppose the Indians declare that they want to take all of
their enti tlement.  The numbers available for the catch
quota then become: (pop.est.) (Max. exploitat ion rate)
(Indians’  declared interest) (“harvest safety factor”), or
numer ically, (1000) (0.35) (1.00)(0.35)=123 fish . Say,
further, that 10 fishermen express an interest in spearing
those fish, the result is that each licensee is issued a
permit to take a dozen  fish.  Now, suppose that the
Indians declare that they would only want to take 60
percent of their entitlement, but the population size is
known only from a two-year -old est imate (safety factor of
30%). Our quota calculation now becomes: (1000) (0.35)
(0.60) (0.30)= 63 fish. Suppose further tha t there is a
light wind resulting in choppy surface water during the
evening specified for the fishing, and, that this condition
causes only 75 percent of the quota to be taken, or 47 fish.
If the population estimate were approximately correct in
the first scenario above, the actual exploitation rate would
then be a maximum of 12.3 percent. Similarly, if
conditions described in the second scenario prevailed, the
actual exploitation rate would have been 6.3 percent.
The overall resul t of intensive walleye management in
Wisconsin since the Crabb decision has been a tribal
quota ranging from 39-45 thousan d walleye, with an
actual annual harvest (1991-1995) of 25,100 fish by
sparing and netting (Anon., 1995).  Creel surveys
estimated an angling harvest (kil l) of 320,000 fish  per
year since 1990. Angler catch (including released fish)
average of 1,200,000 from 1990-1994. Anglers still
account for over 90 percent of the catch from over 800
lakes known to be inhabited by walleye. Annual
exploi tation rate by tribal spearing in 153 lakes with  good
natural reproduction has ranged from 4-20 percent,
averaging 5 percent (Anon., 1995).
In fishery management terms, the number of adult
walleye popula tion estimates has grown from an annual
average of less than a dozen prior to 1986 to more than
40. Fall surveys to estimate abundance of juvenile fish
have grown to over 200 annually. In the few years that
have transpired since the react ivation of the tribal
fisheries, this fishery has gone from a condition  in which
exploi tation rates had occasionally exceeded 50 percent
to one which is consistently within the accepted range of
management objectives. It is now better understood and
better regulated than any other fishery of its size in the
midwest. These remain s a degree of dissatisfaction with
the current situation in the minds of many treaty rights
advocates. It is clear from the numbers presented above
that the Chippewa are not yet taking even half of what the
court has identified as their entitlement. It remains to be
seen whether or not this will change without further
intervention of the court.
Total costs for the state’s treaty fishery assessment
program are expected to exceed $ 1.2 million annually
(Anon., 1991), leading the Senate Select Commit tee on
Indian Affairs to conclude that “The cost of managing the
ceded territory fishery represents only a small percentage
of the value of benefits derived from the fishery ... the
value of the ceded terr itory fisher to the state economy, in
1985 was estimated at $ 240 million ... The value .. to the
Chippewa society and culture is immeasurable.” (Anon.,
1991).
PROGNOSIS FOR THE MINNESOTA FISHERIES
IN TERRITORIES CEDED IN THE TREATY OF
1837
On January 29, 1997, federal Judge Michael Davis issued
his Memorandum Opinion  and Order13 in the case of The
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians et al. v. State of
Minnesota, et al. His summary judgment found in favor
of the Indians in early every point contested by the
litigants. If the Davis opinion were to be fully
implemented, the state would not have sole management
authority to regulate tribal hunting and fishing, but would
be requi red to cooperate with the Mille Lacs Band in
reaching agreement on acceptable harvest levels. There
would be no explicit allocation of 50 percent of the
harvestable surplus to either of the parties, nor would
tribal interests be prohibited  from  prosecuting  a  treaty
fishery in any 
portion of those lakes that are par tially within the ceded
territory.   
State attorneys moved quickly to appeal the Davis
decision and property owners in the region around Mille
Lacs Lake pet itioned the U.S. Eighth Ci rcuit Cour t of
Appeals to stay the Davis order unti l the appeal could be
heard. The latter motion was granted on the
understanding that the appeal would be heard early in the
summer of 1997. The appellate court agreed however to
allow a modest harvest of walleye this spring for
ceremonial purposes.
In attempting to resolve treaty hunting and fishing rights
in the midwest, we have learned much about Indian and
non-Indian cultures. We have come to understand
ourselves and our impact on fish  popula tions. We know
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more of our own history and of the ways in which legal
precedents help to shape the future. We can now more
fully appreciate the conclusions reached over a quarter of
a century ago in the Pacific northwest (Anon. 1970, p.
191).
“The Indians look at fishing and fishing rights
differently, and they fish  in di fferent ways.
Difference is nearly intolerable in a society
which expects conformity in behavior and
outlook — one which tends to equate equal
treatment with identical treatment, acceptable
behavior with conforming behavior, integration
with assimiliation. The Indians’ right to fish in
different ways and under different rules is felt  by
many non-In dians t o be completely
inappr opriate,  and the connection of fishing
right with identity to be nonsense.  Hostility rises
from the threat presented by the differences, not
from danger to the fish. Efforts to control Indian
fishing have been rationalized around
conservation, but they have recognized neither
the pervasive importance of environmental
changes nor the questions of humanness.”
In accepting the Crabb decision, leaders of the six bands
of Wisconsin Chippewa explained their rationale in
foregoing their right to further appeal:14
“ ... They do this as a gesture of peace and
friendship towards the people of Wisconsin, in
a spirit they hope may some day be reciprocated
on the part of the general citizenry and officials
of this state.” 
Will similar gestures of peace and friendship towards
Indian people be r eciprocated by the people of
Minnesota? We shall see.
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